Two years ago, in the cramped and poorly lit interview rooms and corridors of Crypto.com Arena, the telltale signs of dynastic exhaustion and exasperation were everywhere.
Bob Myers was headed out the door. Draymond Green was thinking about an exit, too. Stephen Curry was asking for help. Klay Thompson was starting to wonder if the Warriors really still wanted him.
It wasn’t a complete unraveling, but in the wake of their series-ending Game 6 loss to the Lakers in May 2023, the Warriors’ foundations shook a little and it showed. They’d won the fourth championship of this era just a year previously, in that golden 2022 run, and they had (barely) enough left in the tank for a scintillating seven-game triumph over the Kings in the 2023 first round. But then LeBron James and the Lakers put an abrupt halt to everything for the Warriors.
They didn’t seem to have a solid answer for what should or would come next. They didn’t even know for sure who’d be deciding what they did next. They definitely didn’t have many options, other than riding it out with Curry for as long as he could keep going. They were over-indexed on their past champions and didn’t have enough young talent to take this to a new era.
It looked a little bleak. It looked like the Warriors were stuck.
But they weren’t, actually.
On Sunday, led by Curry and 35-year-old new running mate Jimmy Butler, the Warriors ripped Game 1 from the second-seeded Rockets in Houston with tons of swagger and pure star power. They might not win the 2025 title, but in the two years since that loss to the Lakers and all those dreary emotions, the Warriors have gotten older and better, they’ve reset their payroll, they’re fairly well set up to go deep in the Western Conference playoffs, and they’re positioned to make one or two more major moves in July.
Which begs the question: How in the heck did they get here from there?
The first and sui generis answer, of course, is that the Warriors still can be great because Curry is still great. He’s the formula, the solution, and the life force. And his perpetual brilliance, now at 37, places a lot of responsibility on Warriors management, too. Basically: You’d better not mess up Steph’s final prime years!
When Mike Dunleavy was promoted to replace Myers as the Warriors’ chief decision-maker, he understood all of this. So did the rest of the front office. So did Joe Lacob and the ownership group. So did Steve Kerr. So did the rest of the roster.
So what was the working philosophy from the relatively dire mood in May 2023 to the current mojo? I talked to several Warriors people over the last week trying to map out the path from then to now — step by step — and got different versions of a very specific thought process.
“All-in — with an out,” said one Warriors official, explaining how Dunleavy, Kirk and Kent Lacob, Larry Harris, Chuck Hayes, Jonnie West, and the rest of the executive staff were determined to push as hard as possible — but always saving an asset or two for whatever might come available in the future.
“Never get stuck,” said another, adding that Myers shared that mindset with Dunleavy at one point during last summer’s trade negotiations to try to acquire Paul George then later Lauri Markkanen.
The Warriors knew they needed one more alpha next to Curry and Draymond. They knew they were in an extremely competitive marketplace — everybody needs another alpha. And the Warriors made sure they were setting themselves up for a chance to pull this off.
Essentially, in a series of moves over almost two years, the Warriors traded Andrew Wiggins, Klay, and Jordan Poole … for Butler and Buddy Hield. It was a lot more complicated than that, but when you pull back for the panoramic view, that’s what happened.
And the important part, I kept hearing, wasn’t only that the Warriors did it now. It was that they didn’t do something earlier that could’ve screwed things up at the moment they needed all those pieces to get the Butler deal done.
Another Warriors philosophy, this one coming from Joe Lacob: Don’t do anything major unless you’re sure it can help you win a championship. And if it can help you win a championship, you have to do it.
There was no set two-year plan to acquire Butler the way the Warriors plotted from way out to sign Kevin Durant in 2016. In fact, the Warriors had been calling the Heat about Butler — Dunleavy’s old Chicago Bulls teammate — for months and had been getting flatly rejected. (They also, of course, had the framework of a trade with Phoenix for Durant in February but walked away when Durant told the Warriors he had no interest in a return to the Bay Area.)
Then the moment came this winter, when Miami finally had enough of Butler’s agitation for a new contract and decided it was time for a trade. What was the No. 1 asset they wanted from the Warriors? Wiggins, who easily could’ve been tossed aside by the Warriors over the last few bumpy years.
Here are the important stages of the two-year journey …
June 2023: The Warriors signed Draymond to a four-year, $100-million extension after he had thoughts of trying to push a sign-and-trade deal to Memphis.
The Ringer reported that during this period Draymond was ready to leave in a sign-and-trade deal with Memphis, which would’ve sent back Steven Adams, Dillon Brooks, and other pieces. But while the Warriors were part of the discussions, it’s not clear that they would’ve agreed to any final S&T package.
Bottom line: Within the Warriors’ offices at the time, there was a general understanding: They likely had to make a long-term call on paying one and only of these three players — Draymond, Klay, or Poole. They picked Draymond. They did it knowing he could blow up at any time, which he did multiple times last season, leading to multiple NBA suspensions. There are no Warriors regrets.
July 2023: The Warriors traded Poole, Patrick Baldwin Jr., Ryan Rollins, a 2027 second-round pick, and a 2030 first-round pick (protected 1-20) for Chris Paul.
This wasn’t only about money, just mostly about money — the Warriors dumped Poole’s four-year, $123-million deal for Paul’s one-year, $30-million guarantee, then let Paul leave for nothing a year later.
Poole, of course, was a lightning rod for the Warriors, mostly not of his own making. He was punched by Draymond in training camp before the 2022-23 season (and right before signing the $123-million deal), and the Warriors knew they’d have to pick between the two, eventually. Add in the competitive tension between Poole and Klay over the starting shooting-guard spot, and the Warriors had a fairly easy call. It was time to get off of Poole’s long-term money.
Bottom line: The Poole-CP3 trade off wiped out $93 million from their books — money that now is indirectly part of the two-year, $111 million extension they gave Butler upon his arrival.
Fall 2023 through July 2024: The Warriors broke off negotiations with Klay after he declined a two-year, $48-million contract extension. After a very rocky season with his status up in the air, Klay left in a sign-and-trade deal with the Mavericks last offseason.
No need to relitigate this long and messy breakup, but it’s safe to say that the Warriors had concerns about Klay’s value into the future — and had decided by last midseason that Brandin Podziemski was their best starting 2-guard — and that Klay took great offense to those concerns.
As part of the six-team sign-and-trade deal, the Warriors added Kyle Anderson and Hield. And the salary maneuvering allowed them to use the nontaxpayer midlevel exception for the first time in years — which is how they added De’Anthony Melton. After Melton tore his ACL early in the season, they traded his contract for Dennis Schroder’s duplicate contract.
Bottom line: Breaking the money up into three different players gave the Warriors much more trade flexibility at the deadline.
July 2024: Coming off a lackluster regular season and blowout loss to the Kings in the play-in, the Warriors failed in their efforts to trade for either George or Markkanen.
They got lucky here. If they had agreed to a trade with the Clippers for George, the Warriors would’ve guaranteed George more than $200 million. They would’ve guaranteed Markkanen something very close to that if they could’ve completed a trade with Utah. Neither player’s production was anywhere near that level this season. And the Warriors would’ve been pretty much tapped out in tradeable talent and dollars for a while.
Bottom line: If they’d made either of these trades, the Warriors wouldn’t have Wiggins’ contract to use to balance the salaries in any future deal and they would’ve been pot-committed to either George or Markkanen.
February 2025: The Warriors acquire Butler from Miami in a four-team trade by sending out Wiggins, Schroder, Anderson, Lindy Waters, and their 2025 first-round pick (protected 1-10).
The Warriors needed all of those salaries to match Butler’s incoming $48.8 million for this season. And they only had to give up one first-round pick because the Heat valued Wiggins so highly.
Bottom line: The Warriors are now 25-8, counting the play-in victory over Memphis and Game 1 in Houston, since Butler’s arrival. That’s a championship-contender pace.
And the Warriors’ current payroll commitment is less than it’s been in recent years, they still have multiple future first-round picks available to trade next summer, plus they could move Jonathan Kuminga in a potential sign-and-trade.
Curry has given the Warriors this opportunity. They amped everything up by acquiring Butler. They’ll take this as far as they can go this postseason — and the Warriors still have outs.